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MARKETABLE TITLE ACTS-A MEANS TO
IMPROVE TITLE PRACTICE*
ROBERT T. HAINES
of the Denver Bar

Our Supreme Court has defined a marketable title as one "that
is fairly deductible of record . . . that is reasonably free from such
doubts as will affect the market value of the estate; one which a
reasonably prudent person with knowledge of all the facts and
their legal bearing would be willing to accept."
The central concept of this definition is an economic one.
That is, if a reasonably prudent person would feel sufficiently
secure from the loss of his investment in the title that he would
purchase it without discount, then the title is marketable. However, we do not practice what we preach. The reagent by which
the transactions in a chain of title are tested is not the probability
of economic safety, but is a set of formal legalist standards. As applied to transactions which took place within recent times these
standards are objective in character and provide only a reasonable
margin of security. However, as to transactions dating back more
than two or three decades, they lose their validity in the light of
economic safety as the guiding principal of marketability. Even
our relatively complete set of curative statutes and statutes of
limitations do not bring our present methods of title examination
into happy accord with economic realism.
Probably every lawyer of considerable experience has occasionally felt compelled to reject a title as unmarketable for defects
in instruments which have remained of record for thirty or more
years. Such a result can arise in any case where the description
in an old deed fails to close, thus rendering the conveyance void;
or where it may be impossible to identify the ground described in
the old conveyance as corresponding exactly with the ground now
claimed under the chain of title; or where there is a variance in
names, which exceeds the limits of the doctrine of idem sonens
and of our statute relating to variances in names. These defects,
among others, produce an apparent though usually not a genuine
break in the chain of title. It is because one of our technical requirements for a marketable title is that it be deducible by a continuous chain of transfers of record from original source in the sovereign down to present occupant, that such defects render titles
unmarketable. The customary antidote for such defects is a proceeding under Rule 105 in which some person or persons who have
made no claim to any interest in the property for several decades
*In this article the author recommends certain action to the Bar Association
and supports his recommendations with apparently sound arguments. Readers
are invited to submit criticisms or comments to the Secretary of the Colorado
Bar Association.
I Federal Farm Mortgage Corporationv. Schmidt, 109 Colo. 467, 469.
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will be named defendant, served in all probability by publication,
and solemnly proceeded against at an expense of around $200.00.
That such a quiet title proceeding is often mere legal incantation is demonstrated by the frequency with which clients are
advised that a title is "safe", but that the seller should be required
to put up a deposit to pay for procedures to render it marketable.
This amounts to saying "this title is good enough that you may
at once part with nearly all of your life's savings to buy it in
safety; but $200.00 or more must be withheld from the purchase
money to satisfy the technical requirements of lawyers." It is
small wonder that some laymen consider the custom of title examination by lawyers to be little better than a racket. The public
is entitled to demand that our standards of marketability more
nearly conform to economic reality. But lawyers are at present
almost helpless to remedy the situation because of the absence of
any means of differentiating in principle between mere ancient
phantom breaks in the title chain, such as above mentioned, and
genuine though ancient, outstanding interests. A legislative solution to the problem is required.
The technical requirement that a marketable title must be
supported by an unbroken chain of title from original source has
another undesirable effect on our methods of title examination.
It is an inevitable corollary to this requirement that an examiner
must review and consider each document which has ever been
recorded relating to the title to the parcel of land under consideration. Abstracts showing all such documents become even longer
and more expensive. The time required of the attorney to examine
them becomes ever greater. All participants in title transactions
suffer on account of the endlessly lengthening chains of title. The
cost to the buyer and seller is obvious. The lawyer cannot increase
his fees enough to pay proportionately for his added time. The
abstract company is compelled to forever maintain its ancient
records at high expense but with low return, since most of their
work is current continuations. When they do make new complete abstracts they run greater risk of liability for error as to
entries made from their older records. Title insurance companies
must also carry the added risk of ancient error as well as pay
the higher costs for searching title back to source. All this is suffered primarily to guard against mere paper defects in title, and
not to protect against actual outstanding interests. The time must
surely come when the constantly increasing burden on title transactions will no longer be tolerated.
In some eastern states a custom has developed to make title
examinations for a certain number of years only. In at least one
state such examinations are said to be for "80 years to a warranty
deed." That is, the examination starts with the latest warranty
deed which has remained of record for eighty years. Such a custom
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at least stops the perpetual increase of the burden of title examination and demonstrates that an unbroken chain of title from
original source is not essential to marketability from the economic
viewpoint. However, an eighty year examination still involves too
much needless expense as well as the rejection of titles for defects which, on account of age, should not derogate from marketability. On the other hand, failing to examine to source, requires
closing the eyes to possible actual outstanding ancient interests.
To meet this problem in a better way several states have enacted Statutes 2 which are designed to provide an economically
realistic standard of marketability and remove the extravagant
necessity of making and examining abstracts showing all recorded
instruments. Such statutes have a twofold operation. On the one
hand, with certain exceptions, they render null and void all interests dependent upon transactions more than, for example, 40
years old unless such interests are kept alive by recording within
the forty year period notice of the claim thereto. On the other
hand they provide that a person in possession of land has a marketable title if he can show an unbroken chain of title for 40
years free from such notices of older outstanding interests. Of
these statutes, C. G. Patton and R. G. Patton say, "But of paramount help to an examiner, or to the vendor whose title he is appraising, are the statutes of several states barring all conflicting
or encumbering interests which are based solely upon ancient
origin."' 3 And, of the Wisconsin Act, Paul E. Basye says, "Considering this legislation in its entirety and the system of land title
transfers which it inaugurates, it should operate in a dramatic way
to purge our land title system of its medieval barnacles and establish it as a twentieth
century method adapted to twentieth cen'4
tury institutions.
As an example of such statutes a brief digest of the Michigan
Compiled Laws (1948) §§ 565.101 to 565.109 is presented as follows:
565.101 Any person . . . who has an unbroken chain
of title of record to any interest in land for 40 years,
shall at the end of such period be deemed to have a marketable record title to such interest, according to the terms
of the muniments of such chain recorded within said 40
Illinois, Smith Iurd Supp.-Ill. Ann. Stat. c83 § 10a.
Indiana, Ind. Stat. Ann (Burns Supp. 1947) §§ 2-628 to 2-637.
Iowa, Iowa Code (1946) § 614.17.
Michigan, Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §§ 565.101 to 565.109.
Minnesota, Minn. Stat. Ann (1949) § 541.023.
Nebraska, Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1947) §§ 76-288 to 76-298.
South Dakota S. D. Laws 1947 c. 233.
Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. (1947) § 33'0.15.
'American Law of Property vol. IV p. 843, § 18.96.
'Paul E. Basye, Streamlining Conveyancing Procedure, Mich. L. Rev.
(1949) Vol. 47 p. 1115.
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years. Provided that it does not apply to land in hostile
possession of another.
565.102 Such chain of title must start with a conveyance or other title transaction which has been of record
more than 40 years purporting to convey or create .the
interest claimed.
565.103 Such marketable iitle shall be held by such
person and shall be taken by his successors in interest free
and clear of any and all interests, claims and charges
whatsoever, the existence of which depends in whole or in
part upon any act, transaction, event, or omission that occurred prior to such 40 year period, and all such interest,
claims and charges are hereby declared null and void.
Provided such interests based on ancient transactions
may be kept alive by recording a verified notice of the
claim thereof. "No disability or lack of knowledge of any
kind" shall suspend the running of the 40 year period.
Notices of claim may be filed by the claimant or by any
person in behalf of a claimant who is under disability
or unable to assert a claim in his own behalf or a member
of a class whose identity is uncertain at time of filing the
claim.
565.109 Excerpts from operation of the law interests
of the United States, and the State of Michigan and its
subdivisions, also excepts the rights of reversioners after
terms of lessees in possession, mortgages executed by railroads or other public utilities, prior to maturity, and easements clearly observable by physical evidence of their
use. 5
565.105 Provides form for notices and fees.
565.106 Declaration of legislative intent to simplify
and facilitate land transactions. Claims extinguished by
the statute to include all interest "however denominated
It seems clear that the interests of the United States must be excepted
from the operation of such a law. The use of easements involving obvious physical evidence of their existence is so much like possession that owners of such
interests should not be required to file renewed notices of claim. But further
exceptions should be made only with the greatest care, or, better still .not at all.
The interests of the State itself, like the interests of the United States, can be
fairly easily set up for abstracting by filing patents and conveyances to and
from the sovereign separately. But the similar preservation of records for
various special classifications of individuals, companies and even political subdivisions would be so cumbersome that the value of the new law would be
destroyed. The exception of severed mineral interests from such a law should
be strenuously opposed. In fact this simple way of brushing aside the vast numbers of stale mineral leases, reservations, and the like which hamper mineral
leasing would make it well worth the while of the active operators to record
notices of any claims they may hold which would be affected by the law.
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and whether such claims are asserted by a person sui
juris or under disability."
565.107 Act shall not extend other periods of limitation.
565.108 Relates to slanderous notices.
565.109 Provides period for recording notices of
claims of interests more than 40 years old at effective
date of the Act.
Iowa's Statute which was adopted in 1919 provided the pattern of extinguishing interests of ancient origin unless current notices of claim were recorded. It did not contain the definition of
marketability added to the Michigan law. As originally passed the
Iowa law provided for the extinguishment of interests which arose
or existed prior to January 1, 1900. It was later amended several
times to substitute new, more recent cut off dates as the former
ones became too old to be helpful. The Iowa law is the only one
yet tested in a court of last resort. It was considered by the Iowa
Supreme Court in the case of Lane v. Travelers Ins. Co., 1941, 299
NW 553. In that case Edmond Lane died in 1895 leaving a will by
which he devised 160 acres of land to Patrick Lane for life, remainder to the heirs of Patrick. It was conceded that the interests
to Patrick's heirs were contingent remainders. Patrick mortgaged
the land in the year 1906. The mortgage was foreclosed in 1913
and the grantee of the Sheriff's Deed conveyed in fee simple to
Nora Kinney whose title had been conveyed' to Travelers. Patrick
had two children who were born in 1917 and 1919 and were still
minors when the case was tried. They thus escaped the operation
of all other statutes of limitation. The issue presented was whether
or not the contingent remainders of the two minor children were
extinguished because they arose or existed prior to January 1,
1920, the cut off date of the Iowa statute as then existing, since
no notice of their claim had thereafter been recorded. The court
held that the interests of the two minor children were so barred.
In so holding the Supreme Court of Iowa sustained the constitutionality of the requirement that holders of interests in land of ancient
origin must make a current recording of their claims to protect
them from extinguishment, and that the requirement was fully
effective as to interests of those not sui juris.
In 1941 Illinois 7 and Indiana 8 adopted laws based on the Iowa
statute and in 1943 Wisconsin 9 and Minnesota' ° enacted similar
legislation of an even more advanced type. The Michigan law was
6 See Note 2.
' See note 2.
'The original Indiana statute was found unsatisfactory and was replaced
by a new law in 1947. See Note 2.
0 See note 2.

"See note 2.
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adopted in 1945 and Nebraska" and South Dakota 12 passed laws
substantially identical to Michigan's. Concerning the Michigan
form of statute, Basye says, it "is the backbone of any comprehensive plan for reform in conveyancing procedure. In one step it accomplishes two of the most important objectives enumerated at
the beginning of this study. It defines marketable title positively
and at the same time, as a means of doing this, it extinguishes all
interests and claims whose existance depends on any act, transaction, event or omission prior to the period of time during which
marketability is to be appraised. Such legislation gets at the heart
of the matter and eliminates the practical need for certain other
kinds of legislation
except as to events occuring within the period
13
of the statute.'
For some reason when such legislation is first proposed to
lawyers, their first reaction is often to express doubt of its constitutionality. However, I think it can clearly be sustained, and indeed, that every principle contained in it is already in some degree in use in our statutes. The original establishment of our recording system was a far more radical change in the law of conveyancing than that here proposed. Prior to that time the person
first receiving a grant of land from the owner was thereafter protected from later conveyances by his grantor to others, regardless
of the bona fides of the subsequent grantees in dealing with the
grantor. The recording statutes subjected the first grantee to extinguishment of his theretofore fully vested and protected interest
unless he should record his grant before a subsequent bona fide
purchaser should buy for value, and record his grant. In fact
under some laws the subsequent grantee will prevail even if he
does not record. The justification of the recording laws in thus
impinging hallowed property rights is the obvious fact that the
public good derived in terms of more secure land transactions
far outweighs the burden and risk imposed on land owners to
record their interests. The proposed law provides the same measure
of public benefit in facilitating land transactions, and the burdens
imposed are relatively less than those by the original recording
acts since they apply only to the very few who claim interests
of ancient origin and who are not in possession of the land. A
property owner who is provided with a reasonable means of protecting his interest is not deprived of his property without due
process of law when his interest is lost through failure to take
advantage of such means. If this were not so, no statute of limitation would be valid. The proposed law is in part a statute of
limitation. It requires that the old rights in land to which it relates be asserted within a reasonable time, but permits the as"See note 2.
"See note 2.
"Paul E. Basye, Streamlining Conveyancing Precedure, Mich. L. Rev. June
1949, Vol. 47, p. 1135.
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sertion to be by recording a claim, rather than by instituting a
judicial proceeding. It, also, modifies the recording law by, in
effect, limiting the time within which a recording has the effect
of notice to the subsequent purchasers.
This combination of a modification of the recording act plus
a statute of limitation has already been used several times in Colorado to remove the cloud apparent outstanding interests. Prior
to 1921 a conveyance to a grantee as "trustee" without more provided protection to beneficiaries of the trust, if any, by imputing
perpetual notice to all purchaser from the record. Sec. 10 of Chapter
40 was adopted in 1921. It provided that after 5 years after its
effective date all such instruments theretofore executed should
cease to be notice of the trust unless a statement providing the
required information should be recorded within such period. The
effectiveness and validity of this statute has never been questioned.
It has made many titles marketable which would otherwise have
required a quiet title suit. In 1933 existing mortgage and other
liens securing payment of debts due prior to March 28, 1927, were
subjected to extinguishment unless the requisite notice of renewal
were recorded within 15 years. Section 116 of Chapter 40 applied
the same principle to eliminate the cloud of old option contracts.
Whereas such an instrument of record was previously perpetual
notice of the equities of the optionee, that law limited notice of the
optionee's interest to one year after the date for exercise of his
rights and thereafter extinguished such interests unless a lis
pendens were filed within the year's period. These laws all applied
to interests under instruments already of record at their effective
dates. No argument could be made that interests created after
the adoption of the proposed legislation would be immune to its
provisions.
Sometimes a doubt is expressed that such a law would be
effective as to the possible interests of unborn persons. It is axiomatic that an interest in an unborn person must be contingent,
and not vested. As unvested interests, they are clearly subject to
laws which change or abolish the possibility of acquiring property
under existing statutes or common law doctrines. 14 They are even
subject to complete abrogation by statute. However, this law does
not make any fundamental change in that regard. Under existing
law if A conveys land to B for life, remainder to the heirs of C,
and if no one records the deed, the interests of the unborn or unknown heirs of C will be extinguished by any conveyance by A to
bona fide purchasers; perhaps, in view of the broad language of
Section 114 protecting "any class of persons with any kind of
rights," such contingent remainders would be extinguished in favor
of mere heirs, devisees or donees of A. It is also to be noticed that
Section 10 of Chapter 40, mentioned above, would destroy the
"4American Law of Property §§ 18.93 and 18.95.
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interest of unborn beneficiaries of any trust thereby affected, if
some living person did not record the statement required by that
section. Yet this objection has never been raised as to Section 10.
One further observation should be made as to the operation
of the law. By defining marketability the statute would control
the interpretation of every land sales agreement thereafter made.
Unless the parties expressly stipulated for a different standard
to be applied in determining the fitness of the title tendered in
performance of a contract, no buyer could raise an ancient title
defect as an excuse for refusing to complete the purchase. Where
the parties think it necessary, they may stipulate for a longer examination, but it is submitted that, in view of the other provisions
of the law, such longer examination would never disclose a title
defect.
It must be apparent that the writer is an ardent advocate of
the adoption of a Marketable Title Statute of the type in force in
Michigan. However, this article is not an attempt to sell Colorado
a ready prepared package for enactment 'as is.' Rather, it is hoped
that, by thus calling the attention of Colorado lawyers to the advancements in title procedure in other states that the Bar Association will be stimulated to undertake a careful study of these laws
with a view to drafting a similar one for Colorado. To those whose
interest in this subject has induced them to read this far, it is
urged that they read the comprehensive article by Professor Paul
E. Basye entitled "Strecmlining Conveyancing Procedure" which
appeared in the May 1949 and June 1949 issues of Michigan Law
Review (47 Mich. A. Rev. 935 and 1097). Professor Basye deals
with these statutes particularly at pages 1110 to 1136. These
statutes are also dealt with more briefly in Title 18, American
Law of Property 18.96 nn 38-50 and in Patton on Titles, Supplement 304.

MEETING ON MENTAL HEALTH
The Colorado Association for Mental Health, Inc., cordially
invites members of the Bar and other interested persons to attend
a Luncheon on November 20, 1953, in the Colorado Room of the
Shirley-Savoy in Denver. Henry Weihofen, J.D., S.J.D., Professor
of Law at the University of New Mexico and formerly Professor
of Law at the University of Colorado, will talk on "Mental Illness
and the Law."
Professor Weihofen is widely known as a speaker and for his
many articles on law and psychiatry. With Dr. Manfred Gutmacher,
he is co-author of Psychiatry and the Law, acclaimed by medical
and legal authorities as a major contribution to both professions.
Call MA. 2221, Ext. 32, before November 18th for reservations or
write to the Colorado Association for Mental Health, 314 14th
Street, Denver.

